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VALUE CREATION BY TRANSACTIONAL
ASSOCIATES
Cathy Hwang*
How do transactional associates add value to deals? Other scholars have
characterized transactional lawyers as transaction cost engineers,
regulatory arbitrageurs, and enterprise architects. But those words describe
partners. Although most of the deal team is made up of associates—and the
vast majority of deal lawyers begin and end their careers in law firms as
associates—the literature has said little about the work of associates. This
Article seeks to illuminate what transactional associates do and how they
add value to deals. Building on literature in contract design and
transactional lawyering, it argues that associates help to mitigate some of
the shortcomings of unbundled bargaining. When efficient contract design
demands that contracts be unbundled into separate modules or even separate
documents, associates both serve as the conduits for those modules to
communicate and may, if needed, do the crucial work of reintegrating those
modules into one cohesive contract.
INTRODUCTION
It was Halloween week of 2012 when Hurricane Sandy ripped across the
Eastern seaboard.1 In New York City, seven subway tunnels flooded, the
New York Stock Exchange stopped trading for two days, and sweeping
power outages engulfed lower Manhattan in darkness.2 The law firm where
I worked closed its New York office for a week. As the only person on my
deal team who had reliable power, I took the reins on what we call, in polite

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Utah. This Article was prepared for the
Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, hosted by the Fordham Law Review and the Stein Center
for Law and Ethics on October 11, 2019 at Fordham University School of Law. I am grateful
to my fellow participants for their excellent contributions and helpful comments. For helpful
comments and conversations, I am grateful to Kent Coit, Tom Haley, Thad Hartmann, Matt
Jennejohn, Dmitry Karshtedt, Spencer Romney, and Yaron Nili.
1. See Hurricane Sandy Fast Facts, CNN (Oct. 2, 2019, 5:13 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2013/07/13/world/americas/hurricane-sandy-fast-facts/index.html
[https://perma.cc/LE7F-YQQG].
2. See id.; see also Matt Flegenheimer, Flooded Tunnels May Keep City’s Subway
Network Closed for Several Days, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 30, 2012), https://
www.nytimes.com/2012/10/31/nyregion/subways-may-be-shut-for-several-days-afterhurricane-sandy.html [https://perma.cc/T9W7-E6BF].
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company, a high-yield bond offering.3 I billed 100.2 hours4 that week. I was
a transactional associate.
In 1984, Professor Ronald Gilson wrote what has proven one of the most
important articles in the transactional lawyering literature: “Value Creation
by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing.”5 In that article,
Gilson famously characterizes transactional lawyers as “transaction cost
engineers”—shrewd minimizers of transaction costs who not only help their
clients get a bigger piece of the deal pie but also put pie on the menu in the
first place and then magically grow the pie for everyone.6 It is fair to say that
Gilson’s work was groundbreaking. It also inspired several other scholars7
to take a stab at answering the same questions: What do transactional lawyers
actually do? How do they add value, if at all?
These are questions I have often asked too, but never more often than in
the early 2010s, when I was, myself, a transactional lawyer. Had I looked at
the scholarly literature then (which I had not, because of aforementioned
billing), I would have found few answers to my questions. And that is
because the scholarly literature focuses largely on the work of partners in
transactional practice—the folks at the top of the law firm pyramid.8 Others
have convincingly argued that transactional partners are reputational
intermediaries,9 enterprise architects,10 regulatory arbitrageurs,11 and other
important, fancy names that I believe partners are, and that I also know I was
3. We might also call it a “junk bond offering.” See James Chen, Junk Bond,
INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 22, 2019), https://www.investopedia.com/terms/j/junkbond.asp [https://
perma.cc/C8J8-CLKE] (noting that “[j]unk bonds are also called high-yield bonds since the
higher yield is needed to help offset any risk of default”).
4. I remember my hours as 100.2 and know them to have exceeded 100. In an attempt
to certify that the number was, in fact, 100.2, I emailed my former office-neighbor, who is
now counsel at the firm where I used to practice, and asked him to do some due diligence on
my billable hours and provide comfort for the 100.2 number. He did the diligence but was
unable to provide more than f-level comfort. Because I appreciate that he tried, I thanked him
in the star footnote.
5. Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984); see also Lisa Bernstein, Silicon Valley Lawyer as
Transaction Cost Engineer?, 74 OR. L. REV. 239, 242–51 (1995).
6. Gilson, supra note 5, at 255.
7. See infra Part I.
8. One notable exception is Claire Hill’s excellent article which, while describing the
process of contract production in a law firm, also offers an accurate description of the work of
junior associates. See generally Claire A. Hill, Why Contracts Are Written in “Legalese,” 77
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 59 (2001).
9. See, e.g., Steven L. Schwarcz, Explaining the Value of Transactional Lawyering, 12
STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 486, 493 (2007). The concept of reputational intermediaries is also
closely related to the concept of lawyers as gatekeepers. See, e.g., Sung Hui Kim, Gatekeepers
Inside Out, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411, 413–14 (2008) (describing the role of inside lawyers
as gatekeepers who can disrupt misconduct by refusing to cooperate with it); Donald C.
Langevoort, Gatekeepers, Cultural Captives, or Knaves?: Corporate Lawyers Through
Different Lenses, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 1683 (2020).
10. George W. Dent, Jr., Business Lawyers as Enterprise Architects, 64 BUS. LAW. 279,
299 (2009) (describing transactional lawyers as “enterprise architects” that wear a variety of
hats, including that of enterprise design).
11. Victor Fleischer, Regulatory Arbitrage, 89 TEX. L. REV. 227, 240–42 (2010)
(describing transactional lawyers as regulatory arbitrageurs and as “quarterbacks” to the deal).
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not. After all, as an associate, I did not intermediate any reputations or
arbitrage any regulations. I was just billing many, many hours doing . . .
something.
What do transactional associates do? This question remains underexplored
in the scholarly literature, even though most lawyers never become partners
and instead spend the entirety of their law firm careers as associates. And
with the rise of smart contracting, machine learning, and other technological
advancements, this question also becomes existential and pedagogical: Will
the work of associates survive technological change? And how can we, as
law professors, better train our students so that they still have jobs even as
machines become smarter?
This Article, contributed to Fordham University School of Law’s 2019
Colloquium on Corporate Lawyers, proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly
discusses some of my favorite literature on transactional lawyering and
contract design. With regard to the latter, it discusses a relatively recent
strand of literature on contract modularity—the idea that separating contracts
into self-contained modules and then piecing them back together can have a
number of efficiency advantages. Part II advances a new hypothesis about
the work of law firm associates, arguing that associates help to mitigate the
limitations of modularity. In previous work, I introduced the idea of
unbundled bargaining: contracting where parties memorialize one deal in
several interrelated contracts and agreements.12 Although it has many
efficiency-related advantages, unbundled bargaining also has some
disadvantages: namely, it may be hard for separate but related agreements to
speak to each other. Transactional associates can help to mitigate those
shortcomings, as they serve as conduits between multiple contract modules
and help to reintegrate contracts when modularity is not suitable. Part III
discusses implications. In particular, if associates are conduits in unbundled
bargaining, what does that mean for contract design and transactional
pedagogy?
I. TRANSACTIONAL LAWYERS AS CONTRACT DESIGNERS
In the past few decades, the literature on transactional lawyering has
advanced several theories of how transactional lawyering adds value:
transactional lawyers are transaction cost engineers, regulatory arbitrageurs,
enterprise architects, reputational intermediaries, and more.13 The contract
theory literature that focuses on the design of contracts has added another
wrinkle: it suggests that transactional lawyers, in their role as contract
designers, add value by making contracts and the dealmaking process more
efficient. While work in these areas has been undeniably convincing, it
uniformly misses one thing: that the “transactional” work described is done
almost exclusively by lawyers at the top of the pecking order.

12. See generally Cathy Hwang, Unbundled Bargains: Multi-agreement Dealmaking in
Complex Mergers & Acquisitions, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1403 (2016).
13. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.

1652

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

Later parts of this Article discuss how transactional associates—those who
form all but the very top of the law firm staffing pyramid—create value. This
Part sets the stage by providing a brief overview of the existing work. Here,
I focus on only a few things that have recently influenced me, knowing that
my colleagues in this field have written so much more excellent work than I
can cover in this short Article. Part I.A focuses on the transactional
lawyering literature. Part I.B turns to recent work on contract design.
Although the contract design literature focuses on the efficient design of
contracts and the connection between design and other aspects of contract
theory—such as enforcement and interpretation—it does implicitly
contribute to our understanding of what transactional lawyers do. After all,
contract design requires contract designers and, for many corporate and
commercial transactions, the contract designers are transactional attorneys.
A. Transaction Cost Engineers and Other Things That Associates Are Not
Any discussion of the literature on transactional lawyering must start at the
beginning: Ron Gilson’s powerhouse article, “Value Creation by Business
Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing.”14 This article kicked off an entire
line of literature. Gilson, himself a partner at a corporate law firm before he
joined academia,15 argued that “business lawyers”—transactional lawyers, in
the parlance of this Article—create value by engaging in “transaction cost
engineering.”16
The more technical aspects of his idea rely on capital asset pricing theory,
as the title of his paper suggests. Capital asset pricing theory supposes that
assets are accurately priced when a number of assumptions hold, including,
notably, the assumption that there are no transaction costs or information
asymmetries.17 Gilson notes that the most important aspect of the theory for
the work of transactional lawyers is that, “[i]n a world in which assets are
valued according to any version of capital asset pricing theory, there is little
role for business lawyers.”18 However, features of our legal and economic
system, such as regulations, erode the effectiveness of capital asset pricing.
Transactional lawyers add value, then, by undoing some of those erosive
aspects through deal structures and contractual mechanisms19—in essence,
“engineering” transaction costs for the benefit of their clients.
Gilson is clearly right. But his article’s most enduring contribution is not
so much its technical “rightness” but the fact that Gilson—to the relief of
generations of transactional lawyers—characterized transactional lawyers as
14. Gilson, supra note 5.
15. Gilson calls his article “my dissertation from practice,” noting that when he began
practicing, “[t]he firm’s way of training people was to hand them a deal. I did my first
acquisition six weeks after I showed up at the firm.” See William J. Carney, Ronald J. Gilson
& George W. Dent, Jr., Keynote Discussion, Just Exactly What Does a Transactional Lawyer
Do?, 12 TRANSACTIONS 175, 176 (2011).
16. Gilson, supra note 5, at 253–56.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 251.
19. Id. at 254–56.
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adding value to deals at all. As Gilson himself notes, there had been a longheld and “often quite uncharitable” view of the work of transactional
lawyers.20 At best, lawyers are scribes: businesspeople make deals and then
turn to lawyers to write them down. At worst, lawyers muck up deals by
introducing so many complications that the deals “collapse under their own
weight.”21
Gilson argues, instead, that transactional lawyers make deals happen.22
What happens when two parties cannot decide on a purchase price because
the buyer does not believe the asset is as good as the seller says? In comes
the transactional lawyer, with a contractual device called the post-closing
purchase price adjustment, to solve that problem. What happens when there
are skeletons in the target company’s closet that the target knows about but
which would cost the buyer enormously to discover and evaluate? In comes
the transactional lawyer, with the contractual devices of representations and
warranties, indemnification, and earn-outs. These devices create a relatively
lost-cost system to incentivize disclosure of said skeletons. In Gilson’s
world, then, transactional lawyers are not deal breakers—they are
dealmakers.
In the years following Gilson’s paper, several others have taken a stab at
articulating what deal lawyers do. Lisa Bernstein, for instance, noted that in
Silicon Valley deals—venture financing deals in particular—lawyers play a
strikingly similar transaction cost engineer role to the one Gilson says they
play in merger and acquisition transactions.23 George Dent described deal
lawyers as “enterprise architects”—folks who wear many hats, including that
of Gilson’s transaction cost engineer, but also of doers of due diligence,
gatherers and verifiers of information, and negotiators and drafters of
agreements.24
A favorite paper of mine in this literature is Vic Fleischer’s 2010 paper,
Fleischer describes two ideas for what
“Regulatory Arbitrage.”25
transactional lawyers do. The first is revealed in the paper’s title:
transactional lawyers are “regulatory arbitrageurs.” The basic premise is that
there are “three parties at the table” in any negotiation: the two deal parties
and the government.26 Regulatory arbitrage is “a perfectly legal planning
technique used to avoid taxes, accounting rules, securities disclosure, and
other regulatory costs . . . [by] exploit[ing] the gap between the economic

20. Id. at 241.
21. Id. at 242. And while it would be nice if the uncharitable descriptions had ended with
Gilson’s paper in the mid-1980s, I am afraid to report that such characterizations are still
rampant. A partner I worked with once told me that businesspeople called lawyers “the
Department of No.”
22. Id. at 254 (describing how lawyers can “reduce real-world deviations from the capital
asset pricing theory’s central assumptions,” thereby reducing market failure).
23. Bernstein, supra note 5, at 241–42.
24. Dent, supra note 10, at 309–18; see also Carney, Gilson & Dent, supra note 15, at
180–81.
25. Fleischer, supra note 11.
26. Id. at 238.
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substance of a transaction and its legal or regulatory treatment.”27 In short,
lawyers try to cut the government out of the deal as much as possible so that
their clients can have more of the deal pie. Fleischer also describes
transactional lawyers as “[q]uarterbacking the [d]eal.”28 Like a football
quarterback, transactional lawyers manage the deal, flipping nimbly between
their roles as regulatory arbitrageurs and as transaction cost engineers.29
Most recently, Elisabeth de Fontenay proposed a new idea in her article
“Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering”: in major
corporate transactions, elite law firms add value by giving their clients
private information about market deal terms.30 In this way, elite lawyers
bring something special to the dealmaking table: their expertise, drawn from
doing many deals and the ability to transform that private information into
pricing information.31
In light of these and many other compelling hypotheses about what
transactional lawyers do, several years ago, Steven Schwarcz surveyed inhouse and law firm lawyers to try to figure out what law firm lawyers think
they do and what their clients think they do.32 His findings strongly support
the notion that transactional lawyers primarily add value—or at least they
and their clients think they primarily add value—by reducing regulatory
costs.33 His findings also provide weak support or mixed results for other
proposed hypotheses: that transactional lawyers add value by reducing
transaction costs;34 by acting as reputational intermediaries;35 by providing
client privilege and confidentiality;36 and through economies of scope.37
Hypotheses about the work of transactional lawyers share two things in
common. First, they all describe at least part of what transactional lawyers
do. For example, in support of de Fontenay’s argument, the work of a
transactional lawyer frequently involves digging up recent deal terms and
contracts, figuring out what provisions previous deals included, and advising
one’s client on which of those precedent provisions should be included in the
contract at hand. To find support for Fleischer’s theory, one need only look
at recent tax inversion transactions. In tax inversions, U.S.-based
corporations reincorporate in tax-advantageous jurisdictions while keeping
all of their operations the same as before the inversion.38 These corporations
27. Id. at 229.
28. Id. at 241.
29. Id. at 241–42.
30. Elisabeth de Fontenay, Law Firm Selection and the Value of Transactional Lawyering,
41 J. CORP. L. 393, 396 (2015).
31. Id. at 425–27.
32. Schwarcz, supra note 9, at 488–91.
33. Id. at 500.
34. Id. at 498.
35. Id. at 502.
36. Id. at 504.
37. Id. at 506.
38. Cathy Hwang, The New Corporate Migration: Tax Diversion Through Inversion, 80
BROOK. L. REV. 807, 810 (2015) (discussing how parties to tax inversion merger and
acquisition (M&A) deals derive value from the favorable tax treatment of the combined
company post-closing).
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seek different regulatory treatment for what is substantively the same
company and operations, just as Fleischer describes.39
Second, none of these descriptions capture what transactional associates
do. Transactional attorneys begin their careers as associates; at elite law
firms, the vast majority never become partners. Claire Hill’s article, “Why
Contracts Are Written in ‘Legalese,’”40 offers a glimpse into the work of
transactional associates. In describing how attorneys produce contracts, she
argues that associates often use forms and precedent as a baseline when they
work on new deals.41 They also use forms as a shield: should the deal go
awry, an associate’s act of drafting from precedent creates a rebuttable
presumption that she drafted reasonably.42
B. Contract Design and Other Things Partners Do
Although not directly about the work of transactional lawyers, the
literature on contract design also sheds some light on what transactional
lawyers do.
Since the latter part of the Cretaceous Period,43 the vast majority of
contract law scholarship has been concerned with the back end of a contract’s
life: breach, enforcement, and damages. In recent years, however, a new
line of scholarship has emerged, focusing on the front end of a contract’s life:
the design of contracts.44
One major contribution of the contract design literature is the recognition
that contract design and enforcement are interconnected and that attention
paid to design can reduce overall contracting costs.45 For example, Bob
Scott, Albert Choi, and George Triantis have written a series of compelling
papers that show how early investment in negotiating specific contract
provisions makes little economic sense if those provisions are unlikely to be
litigated.46
39. Fleischer, supra note 11, at 230.
40. Hill, supra note 8.
41. Id. at 66–69.
42. Id. at 67–68.
43. This is a joke; dinosaurs did not contract, let alone write about contracts.
44. Contract design is different from contract formation—offer, acceptance, and
consideration—which is part of the first-year law school curriculum. Rather than being about
when a contract is formed, contract design theory is largely concerned with how to design
contracts, substantively and structurally, in order to make the deal more efficient.
45. See Richard A. Posner, The Law and Economics of Contract Interpretation, 83 TEX.
L. REV. 1581, 1583 (2005) (defining the cost of a contract as the sum of ex ante negotiating
and drafting costs, the probability of litigation multiplied by the sum of the parties’ litigation
costs, the judiciary’s litigation costs, and judicial error costs).
46. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & George G. Triantis, Strategic Vagueness in Contract
Design: The Case of Corporate Acquisitions, 119 YALE L.J. 848 (2010) (arguing that parties
can use vague contract provisions efficiently—for example, material adverse change clauses
in acquisition agreements may remain vague because they are rarely litigated); Robert E. Scott
& George G. Triantis, Anticipating Litigation in Contract Design, 115 YALE L.J. 814 (2006)
[hereinafter Scott & Triantis, Anticipating Litigation] (examining the efficiency of investment
in the design and enforcement phases of the contracting process and arguing that parties can
lower overall contracting costs by using vague contract terms ex ante and shifting investment
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Another strand of contract design is concerned with the design of contract
structure.47 In previous work, I, too, have explored contract structure—
specifically, the role of modular contract design.48 Contracts can be more
modular (with many relatively self-contained parts working together by
communicating through standard interfaces) or more integrated (with
interconnected parts that rely on each other to work).49 In one paper, for
example, I introduced the concept of “unbundled bargaining”: breaking one
deal into multiple related contracts and agreements can make the dealmaking
process more efficient.50 When deals are unbundled, complex technical
parts—such as the tax-related aspects of the deal—can be allocated to
specialists.51 Simpler parts that require more rote work can be done by junior
associates, whose work is billed at a lower rate.52 In another paper, my
coauthor Matt Jennejohn and I noted that when individual contract provisions
are insufficiently modular, contract interpretation also becomes much more
complicated than the literature anticipates.53
While contract design is largely concerned with the efficient design of
contracts, its accidental contribution to the literature on transactional
lawyering is also significant. The clear subtext of statements like “the vast
majority of contract law scholarship has been concerned with the back end
of a contract’s life” is that most contract law scholarship is about litigators.
The literature on contract design elevates the work of transactional lawyers
to work that is worth studying, and what it tells us is that transactional
attorneys make contracts more efficient by, for example, reducing litigation
probabilities and making contracts easier to read, use, and perform.
But, like their comrades who write about transactional lawyering, scholars
of contract design, too, seem to focus on the work of partners.54 In my own
work, for example, I say a few words about associates, who contribute to
unbundled bargains by working on simple modules, thereby lowering
contracting costs for clients.55 But who decides to unbundle bargains in the
to the ex post enforcement phase); Robert E. Scott & George G. Triantis, Incomplete Contracts
and the Theory of Contract Design, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 187 (2005) [hereinafter Scott &
Triantis, Incomplete Contracts] (considering the role of litigation in motivating contract
design).
47. See, e.g., George G. Triantis, Improving Contract Quality: Modularity, Technology,
and Innovation in Contract Design, 18 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 177, 204–06 (2013) (describing
how modular contracts improve collaboration in creating standardized contract provisions);
see also Margaret Jane Radin, Commentary, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and
the Waning of Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1224 (2006); Henry E. Smith, Modularity in
Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006)
(discussing modularity within individual contracts).
48. See generally Hwang, supra note 12; Cathy Hwang & Matthew Jennejohn, Deal
Structure, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 279 (2018).
49. See infra note 61 and accompanying text (providing a more detailed description of
modularity and integration).
50. Hwang, supra note 12, at 1417–18.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 1424.
53. See generally Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 48.
54. See supra Part I.A.
55. See Hwang, supra note 12, at 1423–26.
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first place, and to allocate simple modules to junior associates? In the end,
that is the work of a partner. What, then, do transactional associates do?
II. TRANSACTIONAL ASSOCIATES AS CONDUITS IN UNBUNDLED
BARGAINING
Part II presents a new idea: transactional associates are conduits in
unbundled bargains, and they help to reintegrate modular deals when
modularity has reached its limits. Part II.A begins with a discussion of the
functions of transactional associates. It focuses largely on the work of
associates in large, elite coastal firms that staff deals with large teams of
transactional associates, although I suspect that those who practice in other
environments will also recognize their work in the description here. Part II.B
then argues that this work—which sounds simple, functional, and rote when
described—actually serves a critical purpose when deals are unbundled.
A. The Everyday Life of a Transactional Associate
Transactional associates do many things. Often, what a transactional
associate does depends on their seniority56: it takes an associate many years
to be promoted to partner, so the “associate” moniker refers to both first-year
associates and experienced eighth years. At the senior level, the work of a
transactional associate begins to resemble that of a partner: they take on more
of the work of directly designing the deal, drafting parts of the contract,
advising clients, and negotiating with counterparties.57
For all but the most senior associates, however, the work of a transactional
associate looks more mundane. For example, when a deal begins, associates
often immediately create two documents: a working group list (a Word
document that lists every person from every department working on the deal,
along with contact information) and a checklist (the core organizational
document of any major corporate transaction).58 This checklist is a
technicolor to-do list that makes the most obsessive bullet journaler59 look
disorganized and lists every task that the deal team needs to accomplish for
the deal to sign or close, who is responsible for the task, whether the task is
complete, and, often, where the relevant documents associated with that task
are stored on each firm’s internal document system. The checklist may need
to be updated multiple times a day as documents are added, completed, and
updated—and it is the work of an associate to update the list and make sure
that updated lists are distributed to the group.

56. Associates might also do different work depending on their practice area. This Article
focuses on M&A associates. Much of the transactional lawyering literature is based on M&A.
57. For more on how deals are staffed at large firms, see Hill, supra note 8, at 70–71.
58. Hwang, supra note 12, at 1413 (describing deal checklists).
59. Anna Russell, Can Bullet Journaling Save You?, NEW YORKER (Sept. 7, 2019),
https://www.newyorker.com/culture/culture-desk/can-bullet-journaling-save-you
[https://perma.cc/JE7C-59XF] (describing bullet journaling as “a cultish notebookorganization system tagged in more than eight million posts on Instagram”).
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Throughout the deal, transactional associates also take on many other tasks
that generally all require organizational skills and attention to detail. A good
way to sum up this type of work is that it needs to be done with an “I’ll take
care of it” attitude. For example, many transactional associates will prepare,
near the end of the deal, a physical or digital closing room where every piece
of paper relevant to the transaction is stored. This allows more senior
attorneys to walk through the room and see what still needs attention. In
many transactions—not just merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions—
transactional associates will also be among the final readers of the
documents. They will read with an eye toward ensuring boring-seeming
things, like consistent use of defined terms, consistent use of verb tense, and
accurate cross-referencing.
“Running changes” is another common mundane task of transactional
associates. Often, when contracts and other documents are renegotiated or
redrafted, senior attorneys make changes to the document by hand. That
handwritten document is then given to a more junior attorney to type into an
electronic document, and afterwards they will send back both the clean,
revised document and a “blackline” document that shows the changes made.
The norm of handwriting changes seems to be partly based in antiquity:
one need not spend more than two-tenths of an hour at an after-work event
to hear a partner’s war stories of how they began practicing before computers
were invented. But some of the handwriting norm is also driven by
practicality. Consider an acquisition agreement, for example. As described
in previous work, acquisition agreements are usually broken up into modules
to be worked by different specialist teams.60 Tax attorneys might mark up
the tax provisions, for instance, while antitrust attorneys craft the antitrust
provisions. When multiple hands need to work on the same document, it can
be more straightforward for one person—an M&A associate—to have
primary responsibility for changing the electronic document and for all others
to send their handwritten contributions to the M&A associate.
Transactional associates are also often deputized to liaise with specialists
who are air-dropping in for only part of the transaction. For example, advice
from antitrust attorneys is an important part of nearly every deal done by an
elite law firm: antitrust attorneys help draft antitrust provisions and also file
for antitrust preclearance from the relevant government authorities. But to
do their job well, antitrust attorneys need not be involved in every other part
of the deal—they only need to understand the parts of the deal that relate to
antitrust, and to mark up the parts of the contract that might impact their
work. It is the job of the transactional associate, then, to convey the relevant
information to the antitrust attorney on the deal and to make sure that they
are apprised of any relevant changes.
Transactional associates do similar liaison work with every other practice
group that touches the deal. Depending on the deal, those groups might

60. Hwang, supra note 12, at 1418–19 (describing how acquisition agreements are
separated into “complex modules” so that specialists can work on them more efficiently).
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include tax, financing, litigation, and many other departments who need to
be apprised of just a sliver of the deal.
B. Transactional Associates as Conduits
The role of the transactional associate, although it sounds rote,
straightforward, and even boring, is an incredibly important part of any deal.
To understand why, it helps to start with a little secret: although I and others
have spent the better part of the last half-decade touting the wonders of
modularity in contract design, modularity, like all things, has its limits.
Modularity, a concept borrowed from design and engineering, is a way to
design contracts by separating parts into relatively self-contained modules,
which are then plugged back together through a standard interface.61 Legos
are an example: no matter the Lego block’s shape, it can be refitted with
other Lego blocks through its standard interface.
For complex projects like major corporate transactions, modularity has
many benefits. In “Unbundled Bargains: Multi-Agreement Dealmaking in
Complex Mergers & Acquisitions,” I discussed many of the efficiency
benefits of modularizing one deal into many separate contracts: essentially,
it allows the deal team to divide and conquer a complex project.62 In other
work, I have joined a small chorus (more like a decent-sized a cappella
group) of scholars who have spread the good news of modular contract
design for the same efficiency-driven, divide-and-conquer reasons.63
But modularity has clear shortcomings. An obvious one is that modularity
relies on standard interfacing—without it, the pieces of the system that have
been broken apart simply cannot be put back together. In the world of
corporate contracting, this means that it may be efficient to break a deal or a
contract into many pieces, but that efficiency is worthless unless the deal can
later be put back into a cohesive, sensible whole through the work of some
standard conduit.
Transactional associates are the standard conduit. Consider the process of
running changes. A busy tax associate who is staffed on many deals might
be called upon to mark up a tax-related representation and warranty for Deal
A. In the process, she might insert defined terms that she is using in Deal B
or Deal C into the Deal A document. Left unchanged, Deal A would then
contain tax-related defined terms from Deals A, B, and C. A transactional
associate’s job is, during the running of the tax associate’s changes into the
master document, to conform all the defined terms so that Deal A’s
documents stay consistent no matter how many specialists mark up the
document.
In addition to being conduits, transactional associates also help put deals
back together when they need to be. Even the keeping of the checklist

61. Hwang & Jennejohn, supra note 48, at 299–305 (describing modular contracting in
detail).
62. See generally Hwang, supra note 12.
63. See supra note 47.
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ensures that a deal broken into many modules can eventually be put back into
a cohesive whole. For example, many M&A deals require financing—the
buyer must borrow money from a bank in order to pay the seller.64 The main
acquisition agreement and the necessary financing documents are unbundled
and worked on by different teams—the former by an M&A team aided by
specialists and the latter by a financing team. Even though these documents
are unbundled, they rely on each other and need to work together to make the
deal happen. In particular, the buyer obtaining financing may be a condition
to the buyer’s obligation to close the M&A deal, lenders may wish to do their
own diligence on the company being purchased, and both documents may
need to consider government approvals—such as antitrust or national
security preclearance—that must take place before the deal can close.
Through a checklist, a transactional associate makes sure not only that all of
the relevant interconnected documents and action items for these two parts
of the deal are completed on time but also that, when the documents need to
refer to each other, they do. Like a Lego enthusiast, a transactional associate
takes the two parts of the deal that have been built by separate people and
makes sure they fit back together.
Perhaps the dullest part of a transactional associate’s job is also the most
important. The reality is that, for the kind of highly bespoke contract that
governs complex corporate transactions, there is no good way to fit many
interrelated contracts back together without a detail-oriented human being at
the helm.65 Consider, for example, a proxy statement issued in conjunction
with a public-company M&A deal. A proxy statement is a long document
that often spans hundreds of pages and that is worked on by a team of lawyers
from various practice groups and law firms, in-house counsel, accountants,
64. See generally Sheng Huang et al., Bank Dependence and Bank Financing in Corporate
M&A (June 7, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3010410 [https://perma.cc/4NV6-92S8].
65. I consider the Cooley law firm’s Cooley GO product to be one of the most interesting
automated-lawyering products on the market. Cooley GO allows individuals to use its website
to generate articles of incorporation, bylaws, and other simple governance documents for a
variety of business entity types. See Index of Cooley GO Docs Document Generators, COOLEY
GO, https://www.cooleygo.com/documents/index-document-generators/ [https://perma.cc/
45BS-PEMR] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). Along the way, individuals follow links to learn—
for example, about the difference between LLCs and C corporations—and are, of course,
directed to contact Cooley if they need more assistance than Cooley GO can provide. See
Comparison of C Corp, S Corp, and LLC Entity Types, COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/compare-business-entities-chart/
[https://perma.cc/CST62WMA] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). The mechanism used to generate these products, at least
from the user’s side, is highly reminiscent of TurboTax—the user fills in the blanks with
information like the preferred entity name and Cooley GO autopopulates several documents
with the relevant information. See, e.g., Incorporation Package (Delaware), COOLEY GO,
https://www.cooleygo.com/compare-business-entities-chart/
[https://perma.cc/N7UKACUF] (last visited Mar. 17, 2020). In my view, Cooley GO works well because the
documents it spits out are simple—articles of incorporation and bylaws are relatively
boilerplate. The documents also need very little reintegration to work together as a set; they
are quite modular and can stay that way forever. As a result, Cooley GO can offer a product—
for free, no less—that requires little human oversight. More complex documents, or sets of
more integrated documents, would be much harder to create without human oversight.
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and bankers. The document will also repeatedly cross-reference itself—for
example, “for more information, see page twelve.” It is common, during the
process of putting together a draft of a proxy statement, to leave all those
cross-references blank.66 Before the document is finalized, an associate
reads the entire document, inserting cross-references, conforming style
throughout the document, and cleaning up things like defined terms,
descriptions, and numbers.
While this “final check” task seems mundane, it is both necessary and
important. Modularizing the document is necessary to getting the document
done; in the interest of expediency, all of the different parties who need to
work on the document must work on it in parallel, rather than taking turns.67
But when there are so many cooks in the kitchen, the document inevitably
becomes messy. And that messiness is more than aesthetic: it introduces
potential liability to the deal. For example, imagine that during an early draft
of the proxy statement, the client had represented to its lawyers that it owned
fifty toy stores throughout the country. That number—fifty—was inserted
throughout the proxy statement. Later, due diligence revealed that the client
actually owned forty toy stores in the United States and seven toy stores in
Canada, for a total of forty-seven toy stores in North America. That new
information was inserted into a later section of the proxy statement but not
into the “summary” section in the first few pages. A shareholder who reads
only the summary section might then believe that the client owns fifty toy
stores in the United States when, in fact, it owns forty-seven in North
America. It is the job of a detail-oriented transactional associate to catch
those inconsistencies (or, even better, to ensure that those kinds of
inconsistencies are not introduced into the document in the first place), so as
to limit liability.
In short, the dull organizational work of a transactional associate is the
crucial “putting back together” that modularity demands. Without a detailoriented human being to reassemble the modularized parts, it would be
impossible to capture modularity’s benefits.
III. WHAT’S NEXT?: TRAINING LAWYERS FOR THE FUTURE
When I was a first-year associate at a New York firm, a friend who was
leaving the firm to take a teaching job sent me, through interoffice mail, the
camping cot he had kept in his office for overnight stays.
“You’ll need it,” he said.68
66. In fact, even the preliminary version of the proxy statement, submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission for comments and posted publicly, will leave those
cross-references blank.
67. This time sensitivity is driven by both everyone’s desire to speed things along and
securities laws. Securities laws require that shareholders be given at least twenty to thirty
business days to consider a transaction after they receive a definitive disclosure document—
usually a proxy or prospectus—about the transaction. This means that the sooner a proxy is
filed, the sooner shareholders can vote and the sooner the deal can close.
68. The author is grateful for the helpful camping cot of Benjamin P. Edwards, who is
now a law professor at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

1662

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 88

And, indeed, I did.
There was the month I billed 340 hours, flanked on either side by two other
high-billing months. There was the time I was stupid enough not to take a
vacation day on the Fourth of July and it seemed that everyone else in my
year did, so I was left covering for everyone else’s deals. There was the time
two other associates and I were assigned to “emergency weekend diligence”
that was so emergent that I could not shake loose for thirty minutes to go to
my friend’s annual barbeque, which was about a five-minute walk away.
I was busy.
But what was I busy doing? This existential question plagued me as an
associate and I think, to some extent, it plagues a lot of young associates
working in “Big Law.”
When I was a fellow, I read Ron Gilson’s paper69 about transactional
lawyering and George Triantis’s papers70 about contract design and was, as
a fellow at their institution, fortunate enough to spend time musing about
these topics with them both. Those early academic influences and
conversations shaped my thoughts on transactional lawyering, contract law
and theory, and, of course, the existential questions that had bothered me as
a young associate practicing in M&A.
Now, as a law professor, I also have some thoughts about how the work of
transactional associates can and should impact the way we teach law
students. Many doctrinal law classes, including my own business
organizations course, are taught using cases. Litigation is still at the core of
our curriculum, and we still primarily train students for litigation practice.
As a former transactional lawyer, however, I have found it both easy and
fun to integrate transaction-based training into my courses. For example, so
much of being a transactional lawyer is about communicating effectively to
complete team-based projects. In all of my courses, students work on teambased projects and we discuss, explicitly, how to write emails that are clear
and useful for all members of the team. In my M&A class, students learn a
bit about the main practices that influence M&A—especially tax, antitrust,
securities, and litigation—so that they know how to spot issues and
communicate with specialist attorneys. We also spend some time
researching, closely reading, analyzing, drafting, and marking up deal
documents, so that students enter practice with the skills they need to succeed
as associates. Finally, of course, we cover all the theoretical and doctrinal
principles, read all those old chestnut cases, and work on issue spotters and
hypotheticals.
I am obsessed with sprinkling transactional skills into doctrinal classes
because of two stubborn little ideas I have about the practice of law. First,
the law is a learning profession: junior associates learn from mid-level
associates, mid-level associates learn from senior associates, and so on. I
69. See generally Gilson, supra note 5.
70. See generally Choi & Triantis, supra note 46; Scott & Triantis, Anticipating
Litigation, supra note 46; Scott & Triantis, Incomplete Contracts, supra note 46; Triantis,
supra note 47.

2020] VALUE CREATION BY TRANSACTIONAL ASSOCIATES

1663

think this is a fairly uncontroversial idea. In fact, I have often heard partners
say that junior associates are asked to do tasks for “training purposes” and
not because junior associates are particularly well-equipped to do them. A
seasoned legal assistant, for instance, could probably do a better job of
running changes and reintegrating a document than a green junior
associate—but in doing those tasks, the junior associate gets to familiarize
herself with the contracts that she will work on next year.
But I have a second idea: it is really not the client’s job to pay for junior
associate training. Sure, much of the substance of the job really must be
learned on the job, and there is no way around the client shouldering some of
the cost for that learning. There is no point, for example, in cracking into the
thick Romeo and Dye treatise on section 16 filings until one is actually
assigned to work on those filings for a real IPO. But for basic skills, like
taking a first look at how multiple agreements fit together or practicing the
detail-oriented proofreading and contract straightening-up that distinguishes
a terrific junior associate from a merely good one, the classroom is a good
place to learn. In fact, I think that the classroom is the best place to learn
those skills because students can make mistakes in the classroom without
causing dire real-world consequences.71
Despite the perennial fears that automation will leave our students
unemployed, there is still much work to be done by organized, detail-oriented
attorneys. So far, machines cannot effectively replicate even the basic
reintegration of modules that associates do. But more importantly, effective
reintegration of modules requires legal training. A good transactional
associate must have subject-matter expertise across diverse and complex
areas of the law, and must also be able to issue spot, know when to engage
with specialists, be able to communicate pertinent information to specialists,
and bring many specialists’ ideas together into a cohesive, legally viable
whole.
In other words, there is still much work to be done, many promises to keep,
and at least 3000 hours a transactional associate must bill before she sleeps.72
CONCLUSION
Existing legal scholarship fails to adequately explore the crucial question
of what transactional associates do. However, building on literature in
contract design and transactional lawyering, this Article argues that
transactional associates facilitate efficient modularity in contract and deal
design and step in when modularity has reached the boundaries of its
usefulness by reintegrating many parts to make a cohesive whole.

71. I could tell you some scary stories but, this being a family law review, let’s not get
into the gory details. Instead, just trust me when I say that it can get bad. Really, really bad.
72. See ROBERT FROST, Stopping by Woods on a Snowy Evening, in THE POETRY OF
ROBERT FROST 224, 224–25 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1979).

